SOCIAL CAPITAL AND PROFITABILITY:An Empirical Evidence from Indonesia by Ridwan, Endrizal
 LAPORAN PENELITIAN 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND PROFITABILITY: 
An Empirical Evidence from Indonesia 
PENANGGUNGJAWAB 
ENDRIZAL RIDWAN, PH.D. 
JURUSAN ILMU EKONOMI 
FAKULTAS EKONOMI 
UNIVERSITAS ANDALAS  
PADANG 
2016 
Bantuan Penelitian Fakultas 
i 
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Abstract 
This study examined two opposite effects of two dimensions of social capital on 
profitability. The first dimension, bridging (inclusive) social capital, facilitates 
coordination and cooperation and channels valuable information. However, 
this healthy business environment may ease the potential entry into the markets. The 
second dimension, bonding (exclusive) social capital, promotes market collusion, but 
limits the spread of information. Both dimensions affect business costs and revenues 
in opposite ways. Using the fourth wave of the Indonesian Family Life Survey 
(IFLS), this study shows that bridging social capital promoted market competition, 
which was good for consumers. However, its net effect on profit was negative, and 
bonding social capital had no significant effect on either competition or profit.  
These findings support the view that profit positively correlates with price instability, 
while bridging social capital works toward price stability.
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SOCIAL CAPITAL AND PROFITABILITY:
An Empirical Evidence from Indonesia
1 Introduction
This study will present an empirical investigation of the e¤ect of social capital on
business performances; it denes social capital as the village level of trustthat
facilitates cooperative behavior in an economic process. Social capital has shown
to have a positive relation to broad social and economic variables, but it has been
mainly studied from the perspective of the consumers, e.g., its e¤ects on economic
development (Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 2000), growth (Algan and Cahuc 2010), ed-
ucation (Coleman 1988; 1990), household income (Narayan and Pritchett 1999),
health conditions, and social wellbeing (Helliwell and Putnam 2004; Helliwell 2006).
Its e¤ect on real business performance, especially at the household level, is not yet
clear. The few attempts to look at this e¤ect potentially su¤ered from endogene-
ity issues because social capital tended to be measured by the number of associa-
tions between people (Gomez and Santor 2001; Fafchamps and Minten 2002; Annen
2013). By understanding the causal relationship between social capital and busi-
ness performance, the e¤ect of social capital from the perspective of the producers
can become clearer; and by dening social capital as the village level of trust, the
endogeneity issue can be resolved.
This will study also ll the gap between the macro and micro level studies of
social capital and development. The literature on social capital and economic devel-
opment at the macro level focused on cross-country comparisons, and at the micro
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level relied on the case studies of a few villages or small districts. The scope of the
macro studies were typically too broad to derive at a specic conclusion as they in-
volved a large number of communities with heterogenous characteristics (see, for
example, Knack and Keefer 1997; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2006; Algan and
Cahuc 2010). Therefore, the contribution of social capital on economic success was
indistinguishable from other a¤ecting variables. The micro level studies, such as
Nadvi (1999), Gomez and Santor (2001), and Annen (2001), were too narrow for
their ndings to be generalized to other areas. My study lls the gap by focusing
on one country with multiple community variations.
I will focus on two dimensions of social capital that follow Putnams Bowling
Alone (2000), and each dimension a¤ects protability in opposite ways. The rst
dimension is bridging (inclusive) social capital, which I dene as the level of trust
among community members, regardless of ones background. This outward look-
ing social capital is presumably good for facilitating cooperation and coordination
among community members. It is also good for channeling valuable information
that is benecial for labor productivity. However, bridging social capital relaxes
the potential entry into the markets, which may increase competition. The second
dimension is bonding (exclusive) social capital, which I dene as the level of trust
among people who have similar socioeconomic characteristics. This inward look-
ing social capital tends to increase potential collusion among business practitioners,
which is good to extract monopoly rent. However, bonding social capital limits the
spread of information, which in turn may lower labor productivity. Overall, both
dimensions of social capital simultaneously determine business costs and revenues,
but in opposite directions, and hence, have an ambiguous e¤ect on protability.
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2 Literature Review
The concept of social capital is the recognition that social connections have eco-
nomic value (Putnam 2000). Such social connections include three components:
social actors, organizations, and institutions.1 Thus, social capital has aspects of
social structure, and it facilitates the actors to conduct certain actions within its
structure (Coleman 1988). The Worldbank divides social capital into three main
concepts.2 In its narrower concept, social capital is a set of horizontal associations
between people as social actors. In its broader concept, it concerns not only hori-
zontal associations but also the vertical connections within social structures. The
broadest view of social capital considers all three components plus the roles of for-
mal institutions as an external force to shape social connections.
Trust, the community membersexpectation that each member behaves coop-
eratively, is an outcome of social connections in the broadest concept. As a product
of social relations, norms, and external forces, trust a¤ects community productiv-
ity and wellbeing. The presence of trust is also necessary for information transfers,
which are crucial for labor productivity. The prevalence of trust within the commu-
nity enables the people of the community to be capable to do productive activities
(Fukuyama 1995). Therefore, I dene social capital as the community level of trust
that enables cooperation in productively economic relationships, and such trust
comes from three sources: long-term social relationships, social norms of conduct,
and community enforcement.3
1Upho¤ (1993) distinguished between institutions and organizations. Institutions are sets of
norms that persist over time and could be created by invisible hands, such as language and re-
ligion, or be man made, such as the Federal Reserve system. Organizations are structures of ac-
cepted roles such as rms. An organization is also an institution, and vice versa, if it implements
specic norms of conduct, e.g., the Central Bank, the Supreme Court.
2The Worldbanks website has a special section on social capital: http://go.worldbank.org/
C0QTRW4QF0.
3Social capital has been dened in di¤erent ways, although it is common to view it in terms of
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The three sources, above, make cooperation in economic relationships possible.
To cooperate in economic relationships, each actor needs to have shown repeated
cooperation in social relationships, or the actors need to have social norms of con-
duct. Once the community has a set of mutual norms, trust can develop. In some
cases, trust could be unilaterally placed by the trustors to the trustees (Coleman
1990). Economic cooperation can also be sustained if higher authorities impose an
external force in terms of reward and punishment; because everyone in the com-
munity cannot be trusted at all times to behave within the norms of good conduct,
higher authorities need to impose explicit rules and sanctions. Arrows (1972) state-
ment further supports my argument of the importance of trust: every commercial
transaction virtually has within itself an element of trust. Thus, since economic
activity represents an important part of social life, a societys well being crucially
depends on the level of trust inherent in that society (Fukuyama 1995).
Social capital is productive because it makes achieving certain ends possible
(Coleman 1988). Like physical and human capital, social capital increases the pro-
ductivity of individuals and groups. The most important distinction of social cap-
ital is between bonding (exclusive) and bridging (inclusive) social capital (Putnam
2000). Bonding social capital is the level of trust among community members who
have similar demographic characteristics; it is inward looking and tends to reinforce
exclusive identities and homogenous groups. Bonding social capital is good for un-
dergirding specic reciprocity, mobilizing solidarity, and forming social, economic,
and political collusions. However, this dimension of social capital may constrain in-
dividual actions and choices because it can exclude other community members from
the outcome of social interactions. Portes (1998) and Bourdieu (2008), for example, referred social
capital to the ability of social actors to secure benets by virtue of membership in social networks.
Coleman (1988) viewed social capital as the aggregate of resources to which social actors have
access because of social interactions. Fukuyama (1995) dened it as a capability that arises from
the prevalence of trust in a certain part of society.
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access to valuable resources (Portes and Landolt 1996).
Bridging social capital is the level of trust among community members regard-
less of their demographic background. It is outward looking and encompasses peo-
ple across diverse social cleavages, and it is benecial for linking to external assets
and di¤using information. Bridging social capital can generate broader perspec-
tives, whereas bonding social capital bolsters narrower outlooks. Putnam, in his
book Bowling Alone (2000), illustrated bonding social capital as a social superglue
and bridging social capital as a social lubricant; bonding social capital strengthens
in-group loyalty, while bridging social capital broadens reciprocity.
However, many groups simultaneously bond along some social dimensions
and bridge across others. For example, the Indonesian Muslim Association in the
United States brings together people from one country and one religion as it reaches
people from di¤erent level of education, income, etc. Thus, bonding and bridging
are not either-or categories into which social networks could be divided; they are
dimensions in which we can compare di¤erent forms of social capital. As both di-
mensions of social capital have advantages and disadvantages, both potentially con-
tribute to business success.
To analyze how social capital a¤ects business success, Annen (2001) compared
two studies: Knorringas (1996) case study on a cluster of footwear industries in
India and Nadvis (1999) cluster of surgical instrument industries in Pakistan. An-
nens study viewed social capital as a means to sustain cooperation within social
networks. He argued that social capital created in open social networks could com-
bine high gains from trade with low costs of contract enforcement. According to
his argument, the more inclusive the society the higher the gain from trade. An-
nens study di¤erentiated the two dimensions of social capital by investigating the
networks entry cost: a network is less open to new members if the entry cost is rel-
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atively high. Thus, bridging social capital refers to networks with a low entry cost,
and bonding social capital refers to networks with a high entry cost. Annen (2001)
concluded that bonding social capital was related to poor economic performance,
and bridging social capital is associated with success. In the Indian footwear clus-
ter, caste antagonism created bonding social capital that constituted social barriers
between producers and sellers. Such barriers lowered gains from trade and led to
low protability. In the Pakistani surgical instrument cluster, social groups that
welcomed open membership structures created bridging social capital which led to
good economic performance.
Earlier studies in industrial organization focused on the empirical links be-
tween market structure, conduct, and performance, known as the SCP paradigm.
Market structure, such as seller concentration and cost structure, determines con-
duct such as price and investment. Finally, conduct yields market performance such
as prot, e¢ ciency, and distribution. This paradigm was very powerful, and its em-
phasis on empirical studies of industries were later supported by a strong theoreti-
cal foundation (see Tirole 1988). A central theme of the SCP debate has been what
determines prot, and Bothwell, Cooley, and Hall (1984) classied the hypothesis of
the debate into six categories, namely, that prot is established by (i) seller concen-
tration, (ii) entry barriers, (iii) absolute or relative rm sizes, (iv) advertising inten-
sity, (v) growth, and (vi) that risk di¤erential explains di¤erences in prot. None of
these hypotheses explicitly states social capital as a determinant of prot, despite
that trust must have been a necessary condition for an economic transaction.
However, implicit analyses of social capital as a determinant of protability
began with studies that linked market concentration to protability. In his seminal
paper, Bain (1950) argued that rms in a high concentration industry made higher
prot than those in a low concentration industry. His analysis was derived from
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the economic theory that at a given entry and demand condition, e¤ective collusive
oligopolists could pursue their prot maximization solution at the long-run equi-
librium. But rms with a higher level of competition would sell at a lower price,
and hence, make a lower prot. E¤ective collusion can be achieved if bonding social
capital exists in closely related rms. In this case, social capital determines market
competition, and hence, prot.
Demsetz (1973) supported the idea that market concentration explained prof-
itability. However, he claimed that the source of concentration was less likely from
a collusion. Instead, it resulted from the rmsidiosyncratic characteristics such as
cost e¢ ciency:
[I]t may be that the members of the employee team derive their higher productivity
from the knowledge they possess about each other in the environment of the particu-
lar rm in which they work, a source of productivity that may be di¢ cult to transfer
piecemeal (Demsetz 1973, 2).
Such cost advantage more likely arose from an economy of scale, from technol-
ogy innovation, and from employeessocial capital. These characteristics determine
market concentration and protability. Demsetzs study is related to the concept
of bridging social capital in which social connections with a broader society widely
disseminate knowledge, which is a crucial source of labor productivity. Thus, bridg-
ing social capital lowers the e¤ective cost of labor, and it directly a¤ects prot.
Bridging social capital also a¤ects prot indirectly through market concentration.
Explicit studies of social capital on business success, such as Gomez and San-
tor (2001), Fafchamps and Minten (2002), and Annen (2013), conrmed the posi-
tive contribution of social capital on business success. Gomez and Santor (2001) in-
vestigated whether being a member in a social organization improved business per-
formance. Their sample was self-employed individuals who borrowed from Calmeadow
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Metrofund, the largest nonprot micronance organization in Canada, where a ma-
jority of the borrowers participated in group lending. The group borrowers were
asked to form a peer group as a condition of credit extension. They found that be-
ing a member of a social organization, that meet regularly, was signicantly cor-
related to business success. On average, members earned more than nonmembers.
Moreover, individuals who believed that the membership of a network was useful
earned more than those who believed that the membership was unuseful. Their
study, however, did not di¤erentiate group borrowers from individual borrowers.
It could be that the characteristics of individuals who join group lending di¤er from
those who join individual lending. To join group lending the borrowers need peers,
and thus, they must have a high propensity to join a social activity.
Annen (2013) studied the e¤ect of social capital on sales in small rms, in Bo-
livia, and found that social capital was a substitute for being a formal rm. For-
mal rms have the advantage of operating stores in favorable areas and selling in
noticeable locations. Informal rms typically produce in the outskirts and sell in
street markets. Annen found that social capital provided informal rms security
benets at their production location and increased their accessibility in their sell-
ing location. The formal rms, in general, sold more than the informal rms did,
but the informal rms, with more social connections, were able to sell as much as
the formal rms who had no social connections. Neither Annens study nor Gomez
and Santors, however, took into account the e¤ect of social capital on market con-
centration. Besides being a substitute for formal status, social capital could deter
entry by demanding registration fees, which would boost the incumbent prot.
Fafchamps and Minten (2002) investigated the e¤ects of social capital on a
rms performance as well as on collusion. Using the data on Madagascarian agri-
cultural traders, social capital was dened in terms of their relation with other
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traders, relation with potential lenders, and relation with family members. They
found that, on average, the better connected traders had signicantly more sales
than the less connected traders. Relations with other traders and with potential
lenders raised productivity, but relations with family members reduced productiv-
ity probably because it blurred the rms boundaries. This nding indicates that
bridging social capital is good for lowering transaction costs, but bonding social
capital is not. In addition, Fafchams and Minten found no evidence to support that
social capital promoted collusion among traders.
To analyze the determinants of prot, single equation models have been com-
monly used in the earlier empirical studies. Although the validity of these models
were questionable because of the potential endogeneity between protability and
market concentration (Geroski 1982), the endogeneity issue was not serious. Strick-
land and Weiss (1976) compared the estimation results from simultaneous regres-
sions that treated advertising, concentration, and prot as endogenous to the re-
sults from single equation models. Using the U.S. data from the 1963 Census of
Manufactures, they found that the simultaneous bias was not so important in struc-
ture performance relationships; thus, the single equation models were valid.
3 Theoretical Background
This section provides a theoretical model to show how social capital a¤ects business
protability. In the theoretical model, the village economy is closed. However, to
capture the e¤ect of broader market on price and prot, I extend the model to an
open economy in the empirical section.
The theoretical model was developed from Cowling and Watersons (1976)
model linking price cost margin to market structure. To capture the e¤ect of so-
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cial capital on market competition and prot in the structure-conduct-performance
(SCP) paradigm, I introduced bridging social capital as a factor of labor produc-
tivity, and I placed bonding social capital as a component of the xed cost, namely,
capacity building. As an entry deterrent strategy, rms may collude to overinvest in
the capacity building (Baumol and Willig 1981; Gilbert and Vives 1986; Waldman
1987), and bonding social capital can facilitate that collusion. However, the model
does not specically address in detail the entry deterrent mechanism.
3.1 Production and Cost
Consider a village with N household-managed rms producing a homogenous prod-
uct. Each rm has an identical production function given by
(1) Yi = B(Ks;  ; )Li; for i = (1; 2;    ; N)
where Yi and Li are the output and number of workers for rm i, respectively.
B(Ks;  ; ) is the village level of bridging social capital, which is also the level of
labor productivity. The rm pays a xed cost Fi = Fi(D(Ks;  ; )) and a vari-
able labor cost c(Yi) = wLi where D(Ks;  ; ) is the village level of bonding social
capital and w is the wage. The wage rate is constant due to a competitive labor
market. Specically, the rms cost function is
(2) Ci = c(Yi) + Fi = wLi + Fi:
I assume that the level of trust was su¢ cient to guarantee cooperation in economic
activities.4
4The incumbents often choose to overinvest capacity level to prevent entry. If the entry de-
terence is a public good (Waldman 1987), the presence of bonding social capital ensures the in-
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A rm can hire any amount of available workers, but only after choosing the
output to maximize prot in a given level of industry competition. Given the opti-
mal output choice Y , described below, the rm hires a specic number of workers,
based on (1), which leads to the cost function of
(3) Ci(w; Yi) =
w
B(Ks;  ; )
Y i + Fi(D(Ks;  ; ));
which has the feature of the marginal cost equal to the average variable cost.
3.2 Market Competition
To maximize prot , each rm chooses the output level Y; taking into account its
impact on market price p. In other words, rm is problem is
(4) max
fYig
i = maxfYig
fpYi   c(Yi)  Fig;
which is the revenue Ri = pYi minus the costs given in (2). The inverse demand
function f(Y ) is given by
(5) p = f(Y ) = f(Y1 + Y2 +   + YN):
The rst order condition for optimality is, therefore, given by
(6)
@i
@Yi
= p+ Yif
0(Y )
dY
dYi
  c0i(Yi) = 0
combentscooperative behavor to prevent entry as well as to control prices.
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where dY
dYi
= 1 +
d
P
j 6=i Yj
dYi
 1 + i: Multiplying (6) by Yi and summing up for all
rms yield
(7)
P
pYi +
P Y 2i
Y 2
f 0(Y )(1 + i)Y 2  
P
c0i(Yi)Yi = 0:
Dividing (7) by pY and rearranging it produces
(8)
P
pYi  
P
c0i(Yi)Yi
pY
=  PYi
Y
2
f 0(Y )Y 2
PY
(1 + )
where  =
P
Y 2i i=
P
Y 2i : The rst term of the right hand side of (8) is the Hernd-
ahl index of concentration ratio (H), and the second term is the inverse elasticity of
demand ( 1). By using the cost function given in (3), the left hand side of (8) can
be replaced by (pYi  c0i(Yi)Yi)=pYi. This term could be written as the ratio of prot
plus the xed cost ( + F ) to the revenue (R). Thus, (8) could be represented as
(9)
i + Fi
Ri
=  H(1 + )

:
Thus, by rearranging (9) and using (1) and (5), the rm prot is a function of the
concentration ratio, the elasticity of demand, and the level of social capital
(10) i =  H(1 + )

Ri(B(Ks;  ; ); D(Ks;  ; ))  Fi(D(Ks;  ; )):
Furthermore, because output is a function of social capital by (1), (8) implies that
the concentration ratio H and the elasticity of demand  are also a function of so-
cial capital. Therefore, the prot function can be written as the function of social
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capital only
(11) i = i(B(Ks;  ; ); D(Ks;  ; )):
The e¤ect of bridging and bonding social capital on prot, through the rev-
enue and cost, is ambiguous. On the one hand, a high level of bridging social cap-
ital contributes to a low business cost because of its inuence on labor productiv-
ity. As a consequence, the rms would have an incentive to increase output at any
given price. On the other hand, a high level of bridging social capital corresponds
to higher competition because it eases entry. As a result, the rms are forced to
lower the price. In a similar way, a high level of bonding social capital prevents en-
try by the rmsspending in a high capacity building, but that implies a high busi-
ness cost. Thus, the e¤ect of the two dimensions of social capital on prot mimics
the concept of the demand price elasticity: the quantity and price e¤ects on rev-
enue may cancel each other out. Hence, the net e¤ect of social capital on prot de-
pends on the magnitude of those opposite e¤ects.
4 Empirical Strategy and Data
4.1 Estimation Strategy
To estimate the e¤ect of social capital on a rms prot (gm), I adopted a speci-
cation of the determinants of protability that include both household-level (Xgm)
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and village-level (Zg) variables.
gm =  + 1B(Ks;  ; )g + 2D(Ks;  ; )g +
ZP
i=3
iZig +
XP
j=1
jXjgm + vgm(12)
for m = 1;    ;Mg; and g = 1;    ; G
where g indexes the village, m indexes households within the village, Mg is the vil-
lage size, and G is the number of villages. The term vgm is the error term on which
model specication would be focused. The village level variables include social cap-
ital, distance to the nearest market,5 and the availability of a nancial institution
within the village. The household level variables consist of the number of workers,
the education level of the head of the household, the degree of risk aversion, and
the market concentration ratio.6 My main interest is on the coe¢ cients of bridging
and bonding social capital, 1 and 2, respectively.
4.1.1 Specication
Equation (12) contains both individual and group variables in which the error terms
need to be examined to prevent bias in the standard error of estimates (Moulton
1990). Wooldridge (2003; 2010) discussed estimation techniques related to the cluster-
sample method, as in (12), which focused on the treatment of the error terms. Fol-
lowing Wooldridge (2003), suppose that the error terms contain a common group
e¤ect, as in
(13) vgm = cg + ugm for m = 1;    ;Mg
5The distance to the nearest market is included to see the e¤ect of trade to the village econ-
omy. In other words, the variable expands the village economy from a closed to an open economy
model.
6The index of concentration ratio is an industry variable. Every household within the same
industry in a particular village has an identical concentration ratio.
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where cg is an unobserved village e¤ect and ugm is the idiosyncratic error. My fo-
cus was on the case of a large number of small villages. In this case, the estimation
technique is related to the case of short panel and whether or not the explanatory
variables in (12) are exogenous.
Under (13), the exogeneity issue could be broken down by considering cg and
ugm; separately. Suppose that the covariates are exogenous in the sense that
(14) E(vgmjXg;Zg) = 0 for m = 1;    ;Mg and g = 1;    ; G
where Xg contains all household variables Xgm for m = 1;    ;Mg, and Zg contains
all village variables including social capital. Then, a pooled ordinary least-square
(POLS) estimator, where gm is regressed on 1; zg; and xgm(m = 1;    ;Mg; g =
1;    ; G); is consistent and pG-asymptotically normal. However, a robust variance
matrix is needed to account for the correlation within the villagesheterogeneity in
V ar(vgmjXg;Zg):
Suppose, instead, that under (13) the assumptions are
E(ugmjXg;Zg; cg) = 0 for m = 1;    ;Mg and(15)
E(cgjXg;Zg) = E(cg) = 0:
Then, one could use a generalized least-square (GLS) to estimate the coe¢ cients in
(12). Moreover, if the assumptions include
E(ugu
0
gjXg;Zg; cg) = 2uIMg ; and(16)
E(c2gjXg;Zg) = 2c ;
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then, the GLS estimator is the well-known random e¤ect (RE) estimator (Wooldridge
2010). Under these usual RE assumptions, as in (15) and (16), the RE estimator is
asymptotically more e¢ cient than the POLS.
If, however, cg is correlated with (Xg;Zg), the RE estimator is inconsistent;
the xed e¤ect (FE) estimator would result in consistent estimates. The drawback
of the FE model is that the coe¢ cients of village variables, such as social capital,
are not identied, although one could still estimate the s: Thus, because my main
interest is on village variables, the FE estimator could not be used. Moreover, since
the instrument for both dimensions of social capital were not supported by the
data, the RE estimator would be the only choice (Wooldridge 2010, 867).
To overcome the problem of village heterogeneity, I included province dummy
variables for all villages in the explanatory variables, and I assumed that the vil-
lages within a province had similar characteristics. When province dummies are
controlled, the village heterogeneity presumably disappears. Thus, after controlling
the village heterogeneity, the POLS or RE models remained consistent. In addition,
to prove my result is robust, I used the linear hierarchical or mixed e¤ect model
(Mixed) with province and village variance components.7
4.2 Data
The data for this study were taken from the fourth wave of the Indonesian Family
Life Survey (IFLS) collected in 2007 and available from the RAND Corporation.8
7The Mixed that incorporates the province level transforms (12) into:
kgm =   + bk + ckg + ukgm
where k refers to provinces. The cdotsindicate that the xed part of the model in (12) is not
shown. This model, also known as the three level variance-component model, assumes that all
random components are uncorrelated with each other (for details, see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal
2005).
8http://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS.html
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The IFLS is the only large scale longitudinal survey available in Indonesia. Its rst
wave was administered in 1993, representing about 83% of the Indonesian popu-
lation that lived in 13 of the nations 27 provinces (Strauss et al. 2009). Because
of the longitudinal survey, the IFLS drew its sample from the previous waves and
stratied them on provinces and urban and rural locations. Provinces were selected
to maximize representation of the population and to capture the cultural and so-
cioeconomic diversity of Indonesia. Within each of the 13 provinces, enumeration
areas (EAs) were randomly chosen from a nationally representative sample frame.
The IFLS randomly selected 321 enumeration areas representing urban and rural
areas and Javanese and non-Javanese comparisons. Households were then randomly
selected within the chosen EAs. Hence, the household was nested within the EA,
which was nested within the province.
From the IFLS data set, I selected all households that owned at least one non-
farm business, and I analyzed the most important business of the family. This cri-
terion selected 1,977 households from 16 provinces, 156 districts, and 300 villages
(EAs). I analyzed these nested data by the cluster sample method similar to the
panel data method. The number of households observed in each village varied from
1 to 32, and therefore, was considered an unbalanced panel.
Appendix table A1 presents the householdselds of business. A majority of
the households had a business related to food (e.g., restaurants, grocery stores) and
nonfood products (e.g., pharmacies, hardware stores), which accounted for more
than 60% of all household managed businesses; services was the second major busi-
ness, which accounted for about 17%; and industrial sectors was the third major
business, which accounted for about 12%. In addition, almost 80% of the businesses
were conducted in a face-to-face transaction in which social relations and trust were
important. In other words, social capital tends to play a crucial role in the busi-
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nesss success.
4.2.1 Variables
The business performance (profit) is represented by the net prot recorded by ap-
proximation because of the small nature of the businesses that lacked bookkeeping
technology. The respondents were asked, What is the approximate amount of Ru-
piah (IDR) of net prot generated by your business during the past 12 months?
The answer ranged from a loss of IDR 1.3 million to a prot of IDR 600 million,
with an average of IDR 9.72 million.9 But when they were asked about the approx-
imate revenues and costs, the majority of the respondents did not answer, which
indicates the nature of their business: the households only care about their daily or
monthly prot rather than the detailed transactions.
The questions for bridging and bonding social capital were answered by a vil-
lage representative and measured by a 1-4 Likert scale corresponding to 1. strongly
disagree,2. disagree,3. agree,and 4. strongly agree.The bridging social
capital score (vbridging)was developed through their responses to the following
three statements, respectively: 1. People in this village are always looking out
for each other,2. Most people in the village are willing to help if you need it,
and 3. In this village one has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage
of you.The bonding social capital score (vbonding) was developed through their
answers to two statements: 1. In this village, residents from the same ethnicity
trust each other more than they trust those from a di¤erent ethnicityand 2. In
this village, residents from the same religion trust each other more than they trust
those from a di¤erent religion.The village representatives who answered the above
statements presumably revealed the true condition of their area.
9In 2007, the exchange rate was about 8,000 Indonesian Rupiahs per U.S. dollar.
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The representativesresponses to the above statements are in appendix table
A2. Bridging and bonding social capital were measured separately by adding the
response value to each component of each dimension of social capital because sum-
mation is more consistent to the Likert property than creating an index.10 A higher
score corresponded to a higher social capital. The bridging and bonding social capi-
tal score ranged from 6 to 11 and from 2 to 8, respectively, and were independent of
each other as reected by a low and insignicant correlation of -.004 (see table A4).
Because the data on output were not available, the Hirchmann-Herndahl in-
dex of market concentration (H) was measured by assuming that the output of each
rm was proportional to the number of workers. Therefore, the H index was directly
calculated from the number of workers of in all rms within the same eld of busi-
ness in each village. The H index of rm i with business eld s in village j was cal-
culated by
(17) Hisj =
P
i2sj
(li=Ls)
2
where sj indicates the set of rms in business eld s in village j, li indicates the
number of workers in rm i; and Ls is the total number of workers who worked in
business eld s in village j. The possible value of H index is from 0 to 1, and in
each village rms in the same eld of business have an identical concentration ra-
tio.
Appendix table A3 shows the range of the H index was from :31 to 1; with an
average of :55. Because a signicant number of rms enjoyed a complete monopoly
10Social capital (SC) j 2 fbridging; bondingg was measured by
SCj =
X
i
Qji
where Qij was the score of statement i of social capital j.
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(H = 1), Tobit estimation was used to verify the causal relationship between so-
cial capital and the market concentration. Since the data came from a survey and
therefore did not include all rms, the index may not be the true concentration
ratio. However, the index could still represent the market concentration because
households were randomly drawn from the village population.
Risk aversion (trisk) was measured based on the respondents preference for
several hypothetical lottery options, about which they were asked twice. The rst
option was with a low income guarantee (IDR. 0.8 million), and the second was
with a high income guarantee (IDR. 1.6 million). For the low income guarantee,
one of the questions was Suppose you are o¤ered two ways to earn money. With
option 1, you are guaranteed IDR. 0.8 million per month; with option 2, you have
an equal chance of receiving either IDR. 1.6 million per month or IDR. 0.4 million
per month. Which option would you choose?To measure risk aversion, the sur-
vey changed the combination for option 2 to read as IDR. 1.6 million or IDR. 0.6
million, and IDR. 1.6 million or IDR. 0.2 million, respectively. Similar questions
were asked for the high income guarantee but with a di¤erent combination for op-
tion 2. Based on their choices, I ranked the respondents from the least to the most
risk aversed. A higher value of the risk aversion coe¢ cient corresponds to the more
risk aversed respondent. The variable trisk was the summation of the risk aversion
coe¢ cient from the two levels of income guarantees.
The denition and summary of all variables used in the estimations were pre-
sented in appendix table A3. Besides vbridging and vbonding, vbank and dmarket
were also village variables that represented banks in the village and the distance of
the village to the central business district, respectively. The household variables
were the number of workers hired by their rms (fwork), the head of the house-
holds years of education (educ), and the head of the households level of risk aver-
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sion (trisk). The market concentration index (H) was an industry variable at the
village level.
The correlation matrix among selected variables is shown in appendix table
A4. Bridging social capital had a signicantly negative correlation to market con-
centration ratio H, whereas bonding social capital had an insignicant correlation
to H. Their correlation result revealed that the higher level of bridging social capi-
tal corresponded to the higher number of rms in the market, which was a crucial
transition for social capital to lower prot.
5 Estimation Results and Robustness
5.1 Social Capital and Market Concentration
For social capital to have an e¤ect on prot, it must go through market competi-
tion. Specically, bridging social capital must have a negative impact on market
concentration for it to possibly lower prot. This claim is based on the assump-
tion that bridging social capital increases output and eases transactions. If, instead,
bridging social capital were to increase market concentration, then it would further
increase prot. Bonding social capital, on the contrary, is more likely to increase
market concentration because it has characteristics that potentially mediate col-
lusion. However, bonding social capital is less likely to reduce transaction costs or
improve labor productivity. Therefore, the relationship between bridging and bond-
ing social capital with competition needs to be established as a necessary condition
for the ambiguity of the e¤ect of social capital on prot.
Table 1 presents the POLS and Tobit estimates of the village-average con-
centration ratio H on all village variables, and my interest is on the coe¢ cients of
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Table 1. H Index and Social Capital
Dependent Variable: Village average H index
All Industries Two Major Industries
POLS Tobit POLS Tobit
1 2 3 4 5
vbridging -0.048 -0.050 -0.053 -0.054
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
vbonding -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
vbank -0.016 -0.019 -0.022 -0.024
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
dmarket 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
_cons 0.987 1.008 0.996 1.010
(0.045) (0.049) (0.056) (0.060)
N 1918 1918 1214 1214
R2 0.036 0.050
Log likelihood 428.726 113.231 344.051 177.111
Note: robust standard errors are in parentheses. p <
0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001.
vbridging and vbonding. The POLS estimates show that the coe¢ cient of bridg-
ing social capital was negative, which implies its negative contribution to market
concentration. Thus, in areas with a higher level of bridging social capital, more
rms were in operation. The e¤ect of all other village variables, including bonding
social capital, on market competition was insignicant.
Tobit estimates were used as a comparison to the POLSs because the H in-
dex was truncated at 1. The Tobit results conrmed the negative e¤ect of bridging
social capital, which supports the argument that bridging social capital promotes
competition. All other village variables had an insignicant e¤ect on market con-
centration.11 The POLS and Tobit results conrmed that social capital creates a
healthy business environment: a greater number of rms operated in areas where
communities were more inclusive, making competition unavoidable.
The relation between social capital and market competition, in my study, con-
11The results remained consistent when the regressions were separately conducted on the two
main industries.
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rms the results from Annen (2013) and Fafchamps and Minten (2002). Annens
study dened social capital as being linked to other individuals, which is related
to bridging social capital. According to his study, bridging social capital increased
the accessibility of informal rms within their selling location and provided security
benets in their production location. Thus, bridging social capital enabled infor-
mal rms to compete with formal rms, which led to a lower market concentration.
Fafchcamps and Minten (2002) dened one of their three types of social capital as
the relationship among traders, which is related to bonding social capital. Their
study found no evidence that the traders connection necessarily promoted collu-
sion, which conrmed that bonding social capital had no e¤ect on market concen-
tration.
5.2 Social Capital and Prot
Having established the necessary condition for a causal relationship between so-
cial capital and protability, this section discusses the empirical result of the rela-
tionship. Initially, I regressed protability only on social capital to create the base
model where the village economy is closed. In this model, social capital was pre-
sumably exogenous because the village level of trust depended on external forces,
and, in part, was inherited from the earlier generations. As trust develops over a
period of time, trust is likely to be exogenous to the rms. In addition, to take the
village heterogeneity into account, I incorporated province dummy variables with
the assumption that villages are homogenous within the province12. The inclusion
of province dummies was to ensure that the changes in prot were from changes in
social capital rather than from the unobserved village invariant factors.
12Provinces in Indonesia are mainly the union of neighboring areas where people from a similar
culture live (see Abdullah 1972 for a detailed explanation).
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5.2.1 The Base Model
Table 2 presents the results from the base model that used three estimators: POLS,
RE, and Mixed models. The rst column of each model shows the estimation re-
sults without province dummies, and the second column represents those with province
dummies. The coe¢ cient of bridging social capital (vbridging), in all models,
was signicantly negative. The negative e¤ect remained valid even after including
the province dummies into the regressors. The coe¢ cient of bonding social capital
(vbonding), in all models, was insignicant, which implies that its e¤ect on prot
was not supported by the data.
Table 2. Prot and Social Capital: The Base Model
Dependent Variable: prot (IDR. million)
POLS RE MIXED
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
vbridging -1.901 -1.479 -2.091 -1.637 -1.877 -1.573
(0.573) (0.535) (0.601) (0.529) (0.476) (0.493)
vbonding 0.057 -0.101 0.323 0.184 0.110 -0.061
(0.522) (0.448) (0.682) (0.681) (0.591) (0.556)
_cons 25.104 24.810 25.871 23.107 25.113 24.994
(5.374) (5.043) (5.438) (5.592) (5.895) (5.282)
prov. dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977
R2 0.003 0.020
R2overall 0.003 0.018
R2between 0.007 0.072
R2within 0.000 0.000
g 16.321 16.082
u 23.509 23.509
 0.325 0.319
log likelihood -9190.342 -9173.191 -9182.834 -9171.445
Note: Village cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. p < 0:05, p < 0:01,
p < 0:001.
The magnitudes of the coe¢ cient of bridging social capital were slightly dif-
ferent among the models, but all showed negative sign. The RE and Mixed models
showed a relatively higher signicant level, and they were more e¢ cient than the
POLS. In particular, without the province dummies, the coe¢ cient of vbridging
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was signicant at a .001 level in the RE and Mixed models, but it was only signi-
cant at a .01 level in the POLS. This di¤erence is not surprising because, under the
assumption of serial correlation in error terms, the RE estimator is more e¢ cient.
The interclass correlation of the error  = :325 showed the relative superiority of
the RE to the POLS. In addition, because the regressors were all village variables,
the within R2 = 0 conrmed no variation within villages.
By controlling village heterogeneity, the POLS estimation seems to be as e¢ -
cient as the other two models. The R2 from the OLS jumped almost sevenfold from
:003 to :020 after the province dummies were taken into account, which showed a
better ability of the regressors to explain the variation in prots. The RE estimates
still performed better than the OLS, which was indicated by the interclass corre-
lation around :32. Nevertheless, most important was that bridging social capital
signicantly reduced an individual rms prot, while bonding social capital had no
e¤ect on the prot.
Appendix tables A5 and A6 provide the random components of the Mixed
models and the likelihood ratio test for those components, respectively. The ran-
dom parts were obtained by running the three-level variance component model:
households nested in a village that nested in a province. Appendix table A5, columns
(2) and (3), corresponds to the random parts of the base model, discussed above.
After the province dummies were included in the model, the province level vari-
ance dropped signicantly toward zero, while the village and individual level vari-
ances showed little change, which means that there was almost no variation among
provinces after controlling the province heterogeneity; but there were some varia-
tions among villages within a province. Table A6 provides the results from the test
of signicance for those variance components. The rst test was whether village
heterogeneity across provinces was signicant. This test is equivalent to testing the
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di¤erence between the POLS and RE models (cg = 0). The result showed that
village heterogeneity was signicant at a 1% level when province dummies were ex-
cluded in the regressors, and it was insignicant when province dummies were in-
cluded. This test conrmed the superiority of the RE model to the POLS model.
The second test was whether the village heterogeneity within a province was im-
portant. The result showed that, without the province dummies, the village het-
erogeneity was signicant at a 5% level; but with the province dummies, the village
heterogeneity was insignicant. This result conrmed the e¤ective use of province
dummies to control for village heterogeneity in the models.
5.2.2 Robustness
To test the robustness of the base model, I extended the base model to an open
economy model by adding more village and individual rm variables into the POLS,
RE, and Mixed regressions. The results of this comprehensive model are in table
3. The rst and second columns of each estimation are the regression without the
province dummy, and the third column is with the province dummy. I also ran re-
gressions by including and excluding the number of workers, fwork. The number of
workers appears to be endogenous because of the high correlation between bridg-
ing social capital and the number of workers via the concentration ratio. Therefore,
including the number of workers could overestimate the e¤ect of social capital on
prot. Thus, running regressions with and without the number of workers could
help to determine the consistency of the e¤ect of social capital on prot.
The estimation results of the comprehensive model showed that the coe¢ cient
of bridging social capital was consistently and signicantly negative in all varia-
tions of the models. This consistency suggests that bridging social capital nega-
tively contributes to an individual rms prot. Although the importance of bridg-
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ing social capital seems to decrease as more variables were taken into account, the
decrease was not an indication of spuriousness. When the province dummies were
included in the regressors, the coe¢ cients of vbridging were all signicant. Al-
though the e¤ect of bridging social capital on prot also became weaker, the coe¢ -
cients of vbridging remained consistently negative after including more village and
household variables into the regressors. Thus, the negative e¤ect of social capital on
prot was a causal relationship. Because bridging social capital helped to promote
competition more than to ease transaction, bridging social capital triggered more
reduction in price than in cost.
The ability to explain variation in prot depends on the validity of the regres-
sors. When fwork was excluded from the regressors, the POLS estimates showed
the coe¢ cient of determinacy R2 = :048 and R2 = :035 with and without the
province dummy, respectively. The di¤erence in R2 indicates the relative impor-
tance of village heterogeneity in the models. When the number of workers, fwork,
replaced the province dummy, the coe¢ cient of determinacy became much higher,
R2 = :309; which suggests that the number of workers played a more important role
on prot than village heterogeneity did; but the variable might su¤er from the en-
dogeneity issue. However, regardless of the value of R2 and the inclusion of fwork,
the coe¢ cient of bridging social capital was consistently negative, which is the main
concern of this study.
Furthermore, table 3 shows that the RE results were similar to the POLS
results; but the RE model is more e¢ cient because it corrects the serial correla-
tion errors. Column (5) presents the RE estimates when the number of workers
and province dummies were excluded: the coe¢ cient of bridging social capital,
vbridging, was signicantly negative, and the standard error of the groups spe-
cic components, g; was about half of the idiosyncratic components, u. When
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the number of workers was included in the model, column (6), the groups specic
components g were even smaller. These results imply that the random e¤ect com-
ponent was less important than the idiosyncratic error, which conrmed that the
RE and POLS estimates were similar. In addition, the interclass correlation of error
 for the three models were :28; :03; and :27, respectively. The small value of s also
indicates the relative similarity of the RE and POLS models.
The Mixed linear estimator was used to take into account the e¤ect of house-
hold, village, and province heterogeneity. Its estimates showed that the coe¢ cient
of bridging social capital was signicantly negative, which was similar to the POLS
and RE estimates. Appendix table A5, columns (4)-(6), provides the random com-
ponents of this Mixed estimator. In each model, the village variance was small,
which indicates that the village heterogeneity within a province was unimportant.
The province variance was moderate when the province dummy was excluded from
the regressors, but it became negligible when the province dummies were included.
These results support the inclusion of province dummies into the regression. More
important, all variations of the Mixed model supported the negative contribution of
bridging social capital on prot.
5.2.3 Contribution of Other Variables
Other variables that have signicant coe¢ cients a¤ecting prot were the index of
concentration ratio H, the respondentsyears of schooling educ, and the number
of workers fwork. The coe¢ cient of the industry variable, H index, was positively
signicant at a 5% level when the number of workers, fwork, was excluded from
regressors but it was insignicant when fwork was included. This result was more
likely to occur because of the high correlation between H index and fwork, since H
index was developed from the data on the number of workers. The positive con-
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tribution of H toward prot was expected, because a higher concentration ratio let
rms operate at the prot maximizing level of output. However, H was suspected
to be endogenous; and its inclusion into the regressors was only to test the robust-
ness of the base model. Two additional village variables, namely, the presence of a
bank in the village, vbank, and the distance to the nearest market, dmarket, were
insignicant, which confrims that the closed economy model was a good framework
to analyze business performances at the village level.
Household variable educ and fwork were consistently signicant. The coe¢ -
cient of educ was signicantly positive in all models: the entrepreneurseducation
was an important determinant of business success. The coe¢ cient of fwork was
also signicantly positive, but it may su¤er from an endogeneity issue due to the
reverse causality. The other household variable, namely, risk aversion coe¢ cient,
trisk, was inconsistent in its signicant level, but its magnitude was always nega-
tive, as expected: more risk-averse business owners make less prot.
6 Conclusion
I studied two dimensions of village-level social capital and their e¤ect on protabil-
ity: bridging and bonding social capital. I dened social capital as the village level
of trust that enabled the community members to cooperate in economic relations.
My model argued that social capital resulted from social relationships, norms of
good conduct, and community enforcement. I developed a theory of how social cap-
ital a¤ected protability in the structure conduct performance framework, which
showed that social capital had an ambiguous e¤ect on prot.
Bridging social capital presumably promoted cooperation and lowered trans-
action costs, which in turn raised prot. But this dimension of social capital re-
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laxed the potential entry into the market and increased competition, which harmed
prot. Bonding social capital presumably limited cooperation only among the peo-
ple from the same demographic background and facilitated collusion among them.
This collusion can be used to inuence market conduct to increase prot. Yet, bond-
ing social capital prevented the spread of information useful for labor productivity.
Thus, both dimensions of social capital have an ambiguous e¤ect on prot.
Using the data from the fourth wave of Indonesian Family Life Survey, I found
the net e¤ect of social capital on market competition and prot: bridging social
capital contributed positively to market competition, which is good from the con-
sumers perspective, but it harmed prot; bonding social capital had no signicant
e¤ect on either competition or prot. These results were robust to a various com-
bination of covariates and estimation techniques. The OLS, RE, and Mixed models
supported that bridging social capital worked more toward establishing a healthy
business condition, which encouraged more rms to penetrate the markets. This
dominant e¤ect of bridging social capital lowered prices, and therefore, harmed
prot.
That bridging social capital harms prot was unexpected, because previous
studies on this dimension of social capital tended to capture its positive relation to
household income, health conditions, and social wellbeing. Thus, the expectation is
that it would contribute to higher prot. Nevertheless, the result is supported by
the study of Oi (1961), which argued that competitive rms prefer price instabil-
ity over price stability. Bridging social capital seems to work toward price stability,
which therefore negatively contributes to prot. Although the ndings claried the
understanding about the causal e¤ects of social capital on prot, they did not ex-
haust the impact social capital had on producers. Further research on how social
capital a¤ects other factors, such as investment decisions and market regulations,
31
needs to be addressed.
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Appendix
Table A1. Fields of Business
Field % n
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery 0.9 17
Mining and Quarrying 0.5 9
Construction 0.6 11
Transportation and Communication 2.3 46
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 2.0 40
Restaurants, Food sales 33.2 657
Industry: Food processing 5.4 106
Industry: Clothing 1.2 23
Industry: Other 5.7 112
Sales: Non food 28.2 557
Services : Teacher 0.2 4
Services : Professionals 1.7 34
Services : Transportation (cabs, pedicabs, motorcycle taxis) 4.8 95
Services : Other (tailor, hairdresser) 10.5 207
Other 3.0 59
Total 100.0 1,977
Source: IFLS4.
.
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Table A2. Components of Social Capital
Bridging Social Capital % N
A - People look out for each other
1-strongly disagree 0.0 0
2-disagree 1.3 25
3-agree 81.4 1,610
4-strongly agree 17.3 342
Total 100.0 1,977
B - Most people are willing to help
1-strongly disagree 0.1 2
2-disagree 2.4 47
3-agree 81.1 1,603
4-strongly agree 16.4 325
Total 100.0 1,977
C - Someone is likely to take advantage of you
1-strongly agree 13.9 275
2-agree 77.4 1,530
3-disagree 8.7 172
4-strongly agree 0.0 0
Total 100.0 1,977
Bonding Social Capital % N
D - People from the same ethnicity trust each other more
1-strongly disagree 2.7 54
2-disagree 42.8 846
3-agree 50.2 992
4-strongly agree 4.3 85
Total 100.0 1,977
E- People from the same religion trust each other more
1-strongly disagree 1.9 38
2-disagree 39.1 773
3-agree 54.9 1,085
4-strongly agree 4.1 81
Total 100.0 1,977
Source: IFLS4
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Table A3. Social Capital and Prot: Variable Description
Summary
Name Label Obs Mean Sd Min Max
profit prot (IDR. million) 1,977 9.72 25.32 -1.3 600.0
vbridging bridging social capital 1,977 8.25 0.74 6 11
vbonding bonding social capital 1,977 5.17 1.10 2 8
vbank 1 = if bank in the village 1,977 0.36 0.48 0 1
dmarket distance to the market (km) 1,977 1.74 3.09 0.0 50.0
vid village id 1,977 1 300
distid district id 1,977 1 156
provid province id 1,977 1 16
H Herndahl-Hirschman Index 1,918 0.55 0.31 0.046 1.000
fwork number of workers 1,977 2.29 2.89 1 81
educ years of formal schooling 1,977 6.79 4.57 0 19
trisk degree of risk aversion 1,950 7.68 2.10 2 9
Table A4. Correlation Among Selected Variables
vbridging vbonding H fwork
vbridging 1
vbonding -0.00494 1
H -0.110 -0.0247 1
fwork -0.00933 0.0299 0.0987 1
N 1,977
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001.
Table A5. Random Parts of the Mixed Model
Base Comprehensive
1 2 3 4 5 6
province dummies No Yes No No Yes
var(province) 5.636 4.10e-17 4.143 5.124 4.27e-16
(3.002) (8.52e-15) (2.464) (2.656) (4.64e-14)
var(village) 30.67 22.87 0.000000303 4.90e-13 1.76e-15
(32.46) (58.54) (0.0000655) (5.84e-11) (5.58e-14)
var(residual) 605.1 606.5 619.6 441.1 614.8
(229.9) (386.7) (239.8) (144.2) (238.4)
N 1,977 1,977 1,891 1,891 1,891
Log likelihood -9182.8 -9171.4 -8766.1 -8446.8 -8754.6
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table A6. Testing Variance Components: Likelihood Ratio Test
H0 : var(j) = 0 vs. Ha : var(j) > 0 2(1) p (two-way)
village heterogeneity across province 10.76 .0010
village heterogeneity across province with province dummies 3.49 .0617
village heterogeneity within province 5.89 .0152
village heterogeneity within province with province dummies 3.49 .0617
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